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Abstract
The assumption that education and fertility are endogenous decisions
that react to economic circumstances is a cornerstone of the unied growth
theory that explains the transition to modern economic growth, yet ev-
idence that such a mechanism was in operation before the 20th century
is limited. This paper provides evidence of how protectionism reversed
the education and fertility trends that were well under way in late 19th-
century France. The Méline tari¤, a tari¤ on cereals introduced in 1892,
led to a substantial increase in agricultural wages, thus reducing the rela-
tive return to education. Since the importance of cereal production varied
across regions, we use these di¤erences to estimate the impact of the tar-
i¤. Our ndings indicate that the tari¤ reduced education and increased
fertility. The magnitude of these e¤ects was substantial, and in regions
with large shares of employment in cereal production the tari¤ o¤set the
time trend in education for up to 15 years. Our results thus indicate that
even in the 19th century, policies that changed the economic prospects of
their o¤spring a¤ected parentsdecisions about the quantity and quality
of children.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The causes of the emergence of modern growth remain hotly debated amongst economists. One
of the most inﬂuential theories is uniﬁed growth theory (from now onwards, UGT), developed
by Galor and Weil (1999), Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002), which proposes a
mechanism through which economies move endogenously from a subsistence Malthusian economy
into a regime with growing per capita incomes. UGT builds on two key elements. On the one
hand, technological change depends on population size and the level of education of the labour
force. On the other, population growth and education are determined by household choices which
respond to economic incentives. This second element implies a trade-oﬀ between the quantity
and the quality of children that an individual has, with parents choosing between numerous
but little-educated children or a few well-schooled oﬀspring. Critics of UGT argue that it is
unlikely that in the 19th century fertility and education were the outcome of rational choices,
and that they were more likely to be shaped by social norms than by economic constraints.1
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence for the fact that economic shocks aﬀected fertility
and education decisions well before the postwar period.
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on a major policy shock that occurred in France at the
end of the 19th century. Following a massive increase in cereal exports that were arriving to
Western Europe from the Americas and Russia, cereal prices in France plunged, resulting in a
major income loss for cereal producers. As was the case in other European countries, political
pressure to impose tariﬀs on cereal imports grew in the 1880s and led to the adoption in 1892
of the so called Me´line tariﬀ, a tariﬀ that halted the fall in cereal prices and led to substantial
wage increases (O’Rourke 1997). We argue that, under the assumption that human capital is
less productive in agriculture than in manufacturing, the tariﬀ reduced the relative return to
education and, as predicted by UGT, led to a reduction in human capital investments and an
increase in fertility. It is important to point out that we do not claim that the Me´line tariﬀ
triggered the demographic transition in France, which had already taken place. Rather, we
examine whether an economic shock aﬀects quantity-quality choices at a point in history for
which it is well established that households had taken control over their fertility decisions.
We construct a simple model that captures the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ. Our economy has
two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, and we suppose that human capital is productive
only in the latter. Parents derive utility from both the number of children that they have
and from the expected income of their oﬀspring, which generates the usual trade-oﬀ between
1See Guinnane (2011), Diebolt (2015) and Clark and Cummins (2015) for a discussion.
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fertility and investment in children’s education. The latter is in turn determined by the relative
return to education, that is, by the wage in manufacturing relative to that in agriculture and
by the probabilities of being employed in one or the other sector. A tariﬀ on agricultural goods
increases wages in farming and the employment share of the sector, thus reducing the return
to education and leading to lower investments in human capital. Because parents spend fewer
resources in children’s quality, they respond by increasing their quantity, and the tariﬀ results
in higher fertility rates. The larger the initial share of employment in cereal production, the
stronger these eﬀects are since the price increase implied by the tariﬀ represents a large shock
to the local economy.
To take the model to the data we use France’s division into administrative districts. In
the late 19th century, these districts diﬀered greatly in the importance that agriculture, and in
particular cereal production, had in the local economy. We construct a measure of employment
in cereal production as a share of total employment for 1892 and interact it with a dummy
taking the value one whenever the Me´line tariﬀ was in operation. We then examine the eﬀect of
the tariﬀ on birth rates and fertility rates, and ﬁnd a positive impact of the dummy interacted
with cereal employment shares which is consistent with the theory. Education is measured by
enrolment in primary education, which at the time was supposed to cater for children aged
between 6 and 13. Enrolment rates were negatively aﬀected by the tariﬀ, supporting theories
that maintain that both education and fertility react rapidly to economic incentives, and that
such responses took place even in the 19th century.
The paper contributes to the literature concerned with identifying the determinants of
parental choices between fertility and education. The model introduced by Becker (1960) and
enriched by Becker and Tomes (1976) has been the subject of numerous empirical tests. Most
of this literature has used contemporary data and a variety of identiﬁcation strategies, such
as considering the impact of the arrival of twins in a household on subsequent education in-
vestments; see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) or Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) for more recent
data. Broadly speaking, the evidence supports the existence of such a trade-oﬀ in the second
half of the 20th century, although some results are less supportive (notably Black, Devereux, and
Salvanes (2005) who argue that the impact of family size on education is in fact a relationship
between birth order and education).
In contrast to the numerous studies on recent data, historical evidence on this trade-oﬀ is
scarce, the exceptions being Becker, Cinnirella, and Woessmann (2010), Bleakley and Lange
(2009) Diebolt, Mishra, and Perrin (2015), Diebolt, Menard, and Perrin (2016) and De La Croix
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and Perrin (2016). Our analysis shares much with these papers. Becker, Cinnirella, and Woess-
mann (2010) identify the quality-quantity trade-oﬀ using data for 19th century Prussia; they
ﬁnd suitable instruments for regional diﬀerences in education and fertility (sex ratios and dis-
tance to Wittenberg) and can hence identify the impact of one variable on the other. Our work
is particularly close to Bleakley and Lange (2009) who use disease eradication in the south of
the US around 1910 to analyse fertility and education responses. The exogenous campaigns to
eradicate hookworm, a parasite that particularly aﬀects children’s health, reduced the “price
of child quality” and thus increased the return to human capital. As a result, educational in-
vestments rose and fertility rates fell. We follow a similar empirical strategy by focusing on the
relative return to education. In contrast to Bleakley and Lange (2009), the external shock we
consider has a less direct impact on children’s welfare and rather acts by changing equilibrium
prices and quantities in the economy. What makes the strength of Bleakley and Lange’s pa-
per is also its drawback. Because it relies on a shock that has a direct impact on children’s
quality, the mechanism in operation is well identiﬁed, yet it does not provide evidence that
aggregate macroeconomic features impact fertility and education as advocated by UGT. Our
analysis focuses precisely on a major aggregate shock and identiﬁes its consequences for fertility
and education.
Three recent articles have used French district-level data similar to the one in this paper.
France is an interesting case to study, not only because it has rich historical data, but also since
it was the ﬁrst country to experience the fertility transition, well before any of the other early
industrialisers. Diebolt, Mishra, and Perrin (2015) and Diebolt, Menard, and Perrin (2016) are
concerned with identifying the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ. Using a number of instruments, they
ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ between fertility and education and identify a causal impact of the former on the
latter, thus providing evidence for the mechanisms behind UGT. Furthermore, their analysis of
gender diﬀerences in schooling indicates that the rise in female educational endowments played
a role in the fertility transition. De La Croix and Perrin (2016) use the same data but take a
diﬀerent approach by building a detailed model of the determinants of education and fertility. As
is the case in our paper, their approach is well-grounded in the theory but rather than using the
latter to inspire a reduced-form estimation, as we do, they perform structural estimations aimed
at quantifying to what extent observed patterns can be explained by rational choice rather than
social norms. They estimate the deep parameters in the model and conclude that the rational-
choice model can account for about a third of the fertility variation across districts and over
time, while it explains between 71 and 83 percent of the dispersion of primary school enrolment.
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Both articles indicate the importance of the quantity-quality tradeoﬀ in France during the 19th
century. The contribution of our paper is to examine to what extent these decisions reacted to
an aggregate economic shock. By showing that fertility and education responded in opposite
directions we provide further support for the existence of a trade-oﬀ, by identifying a rapid
reaction to the policy our results indicate that rational-choice considerations must be behind
such changes since social norms are unlikely to evolve so fast.
The paper is also related to a vast body of evidence trying to identify the determinants of
the demographic transition; see Easterlin (1976) for a discussion. Although our analysis is not
concerned with this episode, since France had the world’s earliest demographic transition which
took place almost a century before the Me´line tariﬀ was introduced,2 some of this literature
proposes an approach closely related to ours by trying to identify variables that aﬀect the cost
of having children. Notably, Schultz (1985) argues that the fertility transition in Sweden, which
took place in the 1880s, was largely the result of changes in international agricultural prices that
raised the relative wage in female-intensive occupations. Exploiting diﬀerences across Swedish
counties in the intensity of these activities, he ﬁnds that the increase in relative female wages
explains a substantial fraction of fertility changes. Our paper shares with this work its emphasis
on how terms of trade shocks that aﬀect relative wages in a country can lead to rapid fertility
responses. Murphy (2015) explores French fertility using regional data for the 19th century,
and his ﬁndings indicate the importance of education, particularly that of females, but also of
cultural factors.
Lastly, the paper is related to the economic history literature documenting the impact of
late 19th century protectionist policy on economic outcomes. Following Bairoch (1972), nu-
merous studies have found that protectionism was associated with higher growth rates and,
when systematized to a panel of countries, this positive association between growth and tariﬀs
has generated the so-called tariﬀ-growth paradox; see O’Rourke (1997), O’Rourke (2000), Jacks
(2006) and the survey in Lampe and Sharp (2013). Here we take a diﬀerent approach; rather
than exploiting cross-country diﬀerences, we document that within France the districts that
beneﬁted the most from the tariﬀ were also those where it had the strongest negative eﬀect on
children’s education.3
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the historical background of our study
in terms of agricultural protectionism, education decisions and fertility. Section 3 solves a two-
2See Chaunu (1972), Van de Walle (1980), Weir (1984) and Bardet and Le Bras (1988) for evidence.
3Dormois (2009) uses industry-level data to document the negative impact of industrial tariﬀs on European
industry.
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sector model of the joint family decision between the number of children and education. Section
4 presents the econometric speciﬁcation we use to bring the model to the data. The next two
sections present the data and the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Historical background
2.1 The Me´line tariﬀ and its economic consequences
The signing of the 1860 free-trade treaty with England has been viewed as a milestone in the
historiography of French attitudes towards international trade (Bairoch 1972). Recent research
argues that economic forces largely anticipated trade politics; see Nye (1991), Accominotti and
Flandreau (2008), and Tena-Junguito, Lampe, and Taˆmega Fernandes (2012). Nye (2007) shows
that eﬀective tariﬀ duties on imports were low in France throughout the century, especially on
agricultural products. The invention of the steamship and the development of the domestic
railway network triggered a decrease of freight rates, especially across the Atlantic (North 1958
and Harley 1988) that increased grain market integration; see Federico and Persson (2007) and
Uebele (2011). The resulting boom in trade was mainly driven by large exports of grains and
other primary products from Latin America to Europe which resulted in deﬂationary pressure
on prices in France; see Kindleberger (1950). Agricultural prices declined more than other
prices, thus reducing farmers’ revenues, and generalised discontent led farmers to lobby for
protection although, because of the alliance between free-traders and industrialists, no majority
was obtained in Parliament to impose protective tariﬀs; see Dormois (2012).4
The 1889 parliamentary elections tilted the population of lawmakers towards a majority in
favor of more protection. Negotiations with the governments and discussions in Parliament led
to the proposal of an increase in the tariﬀs on cereals to ﬁght the competition coming from the
Americas.5 Tariﬀs were introduced ad valorem: for each 100 kilos of cereals, the tariﬀ increased
the import price by 5 francs in 1892, which amounted to about 25% of the import price (see 1
below and Golob, 1944, p. 204). The economic magnitude of the tariﬀ was substantial. Levasseur
(1911, vol. II, p. 585) estimates that the Me´line tariﬀ, if applied earlier, would have increased
the cereal prices in 1889 by 80%. Moreover, the law allowed for the tariﬀ to be adjusted every
4Farmers’ lobbying in the 1880s only led to th introduction of two diﬀerent tariﬀs on wheat, depending on
whether the country of origin of the product was granted the ’most-favored nation’ clause or not. All of France’s
major trading partners were granted this clause, see Bassino and Dormois (1972).
5The tariﬀ is named after Jules Me´line, MP, several times agriculture minister and Prime Minister from 1896
to 1898. Me´line, a staunch defender of agriculture, proposes to parliament the adoption of a tariﬀ on cereals,
which once adopted it becomes known as the “Me´line tariﬀ”. Me´line justiﬁed the increase of the tariﬀ by saying
to lawmakers that ”suddenly came the development of the means of transportation and communication, the rapid
decrease in freight costs, in a few years placing these great markets [i.e. America, India and Australia] at our
door”; quoted in Golob (1944, p.182)
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Figure 1: Cereal price in France, 1872-1913
year to take into account variations in the world price of cereals. According to Auge´-Laribe´
(1950, p. 246-7) and Golob (1944, p. 234) there were thirty major legislative modiﬁcations of
the tariﬀ structure of 20 years. For example, in 1894 the wheat duty was increased from 5 to
7 francs per hundred kilograms, and in general was responsive to the underlying import price
during the twenty years that followed the adoption of the Me´line tariﬀ.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the price of cereals over our period of interest. Between
1871 and 1891 the import price of cereals had fallen by 35%, reaching a value of 22 francs per
100 kilos by 1892. The import price continued to fall in the years immediately following the
introduction of the tariﬀ, with the lowest price being reached in 1895. With an import price
of 13.5 francs that year, the 7 franc tariﬀ implied a massive increase in the market price of
cereals. Over the following two decades, import prices ﬂuctuated around 19 francs, with the
duties increasing the price by an average of 37 percent and substantially stabilizing the domestic
price.
The magnitude of the eﬀects of the tariﬀ was enormous. In a context in which the world
price of grains decreased by a third, economist Daniel Zolla (1903, p. 26-33) noted that the
tariﬀ ”succeeds in limiting the reduction in prices compared to England or Germany”. For
7
10
20
30
40
50
pe
r 1
,0
00
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
year
Note: The grey area is the treatment period (1892-1913)
Source: Blayo and Henry (1975), Dupaquier (1988) and INSEE (see text)
Figure 2: The birth rate in France 1740-2013
example, Zolla computes a price diﬀerence equal to half of the price in London for wheat (after
1892, the price levelled at 10 francs in England against 15 francs in France, cf. p. 28). Using
a model that allows him to construct a counterfactual with free trade in cereals, O’Rourke
(1997) documents that the Me´line tariﬀ protected farmers revenue from most of this decline
by increasing domestic prices by 26.5%. In a country in which the agricultural population
represented 50% of the working population (Golob, 1944, p. 18), the tariﬀ implied that actual
French grain output was twice as large as it would have been in the absence of protection. The
overall eﬀect of the reduction in world prices plus the tariﬀs was an increase in the average real
wages, largely driven by the wages of farmers who were made better oﬀ compared to the rest of
the population (see also Zolla, 1903).6
2.2 Education, fertility and the demographic transition in France
As it is widely acknowledged, France was the ﬁrst country to experience a fertility transition; see
Guinnane (2011) for a discussion in an international context. Figure 1 depicts the crude birth
6The impact of tariﬀs during the 19th century on wages and income is a complex question. See, for example
O’Rourke (2000) and the survey in Lampe and Sharp (2013).
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rate in France over the period 1740 to 2012, with our period of interest (1872-1913) shaded.7
The ﬁrst few years in the sample exhibit the usual pre-transition birth rate of around 40 children
per thousand individuals. Birth rates started to decline around 1790, almost one century before
the fertility transition took place in England and Germany. The reasons for this early transition
are still poorly understood. It has been argued that the unique and spectacular reduction in
mortality that took place in France in the second half of the 18th century could be a trigger, while
other authors have emphasised the role of wealth and the changes in inequality that followed the
French Revolution; see Wrigley (1985a, 1985b), Guinnane (2011), and Cummins (2013) amongst
others. In contrast to other countries, where the late 19th century witnessed major changes in
fertility behaviour, the period just before the introduction of the Me´line tariﬀ consists of two
decades of substantial stability, with birth rates in France continuing their long–run trend, as
can be seen from ﬁgure 2. There is nevertheless a slowdown of the trend after 1892. The birth
rate fell by 2.5 children between 1872 and 1882 and by 1.9 children in the next decade (reductions
of 1 and 0.75%, respectively), yet in the decade following the introduction of the tariﬀ the birth
rate declined by only 0.7 children (i.e. by 0.3%). Fertility changed momentum after World War
I, falling by 2.5 children between 1924 (the year in which the birth rate returned to its pre-war
level) and 1934.
Figure 3 uses our district-level data to compute national aggregates for crude birth rates and
enrolment rates (see section 4 for the details). The change in the birth-rate trend is apparent
here. The rapid decline over the previous two decades comes to a halt, with birth rates increasing
slightly just after the introduction of the tariﬀ before declining again, although at a slower pace.
Turning now to the schooling, the expansion of education in France took place in the middle
of the 19th century, the result of major legal changes and a substantial investment in education
infrastructure; see Prost (1993). Historians of education describe the period 1837-1867 as a
period of “universalization” of primary education (Furet and Ozouf 1977; Grew and Harrigan
1991). The Guizot law of 1833, and the Duruy law of 1867, oﬃcially organised primary education
by requiring any agglomeration of more than 500 inhabitants to open, respectively, a boys’ and
a girls’ primary school, introducing a minimum wage for teachers, and facilitating access to
schooling by the children of households that were unable to aﬀord school fees. As a result, by
the time the Ferry laws were introduced (1881-1882) to implement compulsory and free private
education, a majority of districts had attained enrolment rates close to one hundred percent. A
7Blayo and Henry (1975) is the source of the series before 1800. The 1946 INSEE statistical yearbook gives
19th century numbers, with the corrections proposed in Dupaquier (1988). The digitized series on the INSEE
website are the source of ﬁgures for the 20th century.
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puzzle in the literature is that of the “lost decade”. Between 1886 and 1896 not only there is
no progress in primary schooling, but many districts experienced a decline in enrolment rates,
with the average falling by 3.9% and 4.4% for boys and girls respectively; see Prost (1993, p
71). The timing of these changes raises the question of whether the Me´line tariﬀ was one of the
factors behind them.
Figure 3 presents one of our measures of education, enrolment rates in public and private
primary schools, deﬁned as number of pupils aged 6 to 13 enrolled over the total population of
children aged 6 to 13 (see below for the details). Enrolment rates increased before the passing of
the tariﬀ, but the puzzle noticed by Prost (1993) is apparent, as the enrolment rate of children
aged 6 to 13 decreased from 1891 to 1901, only to recover in 1906.
2.3 The returns to education
A key assumption underlying the mechanism that we will explore is that the return to human
capital was higher in manufacturing than in agriculture in late 19th century France. Unfortu-
nately, we have no direct measures of these returns as individual data on wages and education
over the period is not available, but a number of elements point towards this being a reasonable
hypothesis.
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Data on education by sector of employment are scarce, and the earliest ﬁgures we have
been able to ﬁnd correspond to 1906. They indicate that even at this time, lacking education
was substantially more common amongst those working in agriculture than in manufacturing:
illiteracy rates for females were 8.4 percent in manufacturing and almost double amongst those
employed in agriculture (15.6%), for men they were 9.2 percent and 12.6 percent, respectively.8
Table 1 presents evidence on the urban-rural wage gap during our period of interest, deﬁned
as the ratio of the nominal wages in the two types of location for salaried males. We consider
wages paid for (unskilled) farm-related work as the nominal wages in rural areas. Wages paid to
unskilled workers in urban areas are those paid in the capital city of the region. Table 1 presents
two levels of aggregation of the wage gap. The ﬁnest level is at the de´partement level. As a
robustness check, we also present the wage gap between the capital city of the region (which
grouped 4 to 5 de´partements) and the average paid in the countryside of the region. Lastly, we
report the wage gap computed using wages averaged at the national level.
The wage gap at those three levels of aggregation exhibited a similar evolution. The regional
ﬁgures indicate that there was a moderate gap of 10% around 1850, which grew sharply in
the following decades and stabilized around 50% in the late 19th and early 20th century. The
de´partement data exhibits a lower wage gap, which is explained by the fact that wages in the
de´partement capital cities were on average lower than wages in the regional capital cities. The
national data also shows a slow decrease in the wage gap after the introduction of the tariﬀ.
This large diﬀerence is diﬃcult to justify simply by the cost of mobility and the cost of living,
and is likely to have been due to diﬀerences in human capital across the two sectors.9
1852 1882 1892 1896 1900 1906 1911
De´partement 0.99 1.18 1.29 1.27
Regional 1.1 1.29 1.48 1.51
National 1.53 1.43 1.48 1.45 1.41
Source: De´partement and regional: Sicsic (1992, p. 685); National: Simiand (1931, table 1).
Table 1: The urban/rural wage gap ratios
The likely explanation for the low educational achievement of the French agricultural labour
force is the relative technological backwardness of the sector during the 1870–1913 period. Al-
though the reverse hypothesis has been proposed, explaining the low productivity of the agricul-
8The data are from the Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1910, and are reported by Chanut, Heﬀer, Mairesse,
and Postel-Vinay (1995). See also Furet and Ozouf (1977).
9See Chanut, Heﬀer, Mairesse, and Postel-Vinay (1995) for further discussion of wages in France in the 19th
century.
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tural sector by the lack of education of French peasants (Barral 1968; Weber 1976) or their low
appetite for technological progress (Barral 1968), recent work maintains that it was due to the
lack of agricultural investment (Postel-Vinay 1991; Grantham 1993; Postel-Vinay 1998). Male
labour productivity in French agriculture was only 60% of that in England in 1880, and that it
had grown to 72% by 1910, a modest catch-up; see Bairoch (1965) as well as more recent studies
(O’Brien and Keyder 2011). Dormois (1996) shows that during the 1890-1910 period, France
had the fourth lowest average increase of agricultural productivity of the developed world, far
behind Germany or the Scandinavian countries. The yield per hectare in wheat production was
twice as low in France as in all other European countries except Russia and Italy (Bairoch 1989).
Yet it is important to emphasize that this pattern was not prevalent in all of Europe, since in
some countries technology had made rapid inroads into the agricultural sector, thus increasing
the demand for educated farm workers.10
3 Modelling education and fertility decisions
In order to understand the way in which tariﬀs aﬀect fertility and education investments, we
consider a two-sector version of the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ model developed by Galor and Weil
(1999) and Galor and Weil (2000) that abstracts from technological change. The production
side of the economy features two goods, an agricultural good and a manufacturing good. The
later is the numeraire, while the agricultural good is traded and has an exogenously given price
pt that will be the source of the shock we consider. As in the original model, the key decision is
the choice by households of the number of children and their education, i.e. their quantity and
quality, in response to economic incentives.
3.1 Technologies and preferences
The economy produces two goods, an agricultural good and a manufacturing good. The former
is produced using land T and labour Lat according to the following technology
Yat = (AT )
1−αLαat, (1)
where Yat is agricultural output, A is agricultural productivity, and 0 < α < 1. The manufac-
turing good is also produced through a Cobb-Douglas technology of the form
Ymt = K
1−α (htLmt)α , (2)
10See Golob (1944) on the technological backwardness of French agriculture, O’Brien and Keyder (2011) on a
comparison between France and England, and Henriksen, Lampe, and Sharp (2011) for a study of the Danish
experience.
12
where Ymt is manufacturing output, K is a ﬁxed factor in the sector (potentially capital, but we
abstract from its accumulation), ht the average human capital of workers and Lmt employment
in the sector. The price of the manufacturing good is 1, while that of the agricultural good
is pt and will be the source of the shock we consider. A crucial assumption in the model is
that human capital increases productivity in the manufacturing sector but not in agriculture.
Although this is an extreme assumption, it is intended to capture in a simple way the idea that
the return to education was higher in manufacturing.
The two sectors pay workers their marginal product, and in the appendix we derive the
agricultural wage, wat, and the wage per eﬃciency unit of labour in manufacturing, wmt. Under
our assumption that education has no impact on agricultural productivity, the income of a farmer
is simply wat. In contrast, human capital increases manufacturing productivity, implying that
an agent with ht eﬃciency units of labour receives a potential income of htwmt. Labour market
equilibrium requires the equalization of incomes across sectors, i.e. watpt = htwmt, and yields
the fraction of the population employed in agriculture qt and that employed in manufacturing
1− qt.
We turn next to households’ preferences and constraints. Agents live for 2 periods, in the ﬁrst
one they are born and receive education from their parents, in the second they are adults and
are endowed with 1 unit of time, which they may spend working or raising children. Borrowing
across periods is assumed not to be possible.
We suppose that the utility of an agent born at time t is given by
Ut = c
1−γ
t (nt+1Eyt+1)
γ , (3)
where ct is the lifetime consumption of the individual, nt+1 the number of children she has
(which are born at t + 1) and Eyt+1 the expected (potential) income that her oﬀspring (born
at t + 1) will get when she is an adult. The time cost of bearing nt children is given by τ
qnt,
while τ eetnt is the time cost of giving them a level of education et. The budget constraint is
then given by
ct = yt(1− (τ q + τ eet+1)nt+1),
where yt is the potential income when the individual is an adult. We suppose that a constant
fraction of consumption is allocated to the agricultural good and the rest to the manufacturing
good.11
Adults whose parents invested et in their education have a level of human capital h(et) with
11It would be straight forward to derive such a result from a Cobb-Douglas utility function with two goods. We
abstract from such decision in order to concentrate on the key aspects of the model.
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h(et) = βe
θ
t , (4)
where β > 0 and θ ∈ (0, 1), implying that h(et) is increasing in et and exhibits diminishing
returns to the education investment. When taking the education decision of their children,
parents suppose that with probability q they will work in agriculture and with probability
(1− q) in manufacturing. The resulting expected potential income of an adult born at t is
Eyt = qt+1wat+1 + (1− qt+1)h(et)wmt+1.
Clearly, the higher the agricultural wage and agricultural employment are, the lower the relative
return to education will be, thus reducing the incentive of parents to forgo consumption in order
to increase the education of their children. This mechanism will drive our results.
3.2 Solving the model
Education and fertility
The problem faced by an individual born at time t is given by
max
n,e
Ut = c
1−γ
t (nt+1Eyt+1)
γ (5)
s.t. ct = yt(1− (τ q + τ eet+1)nt+1)
yt = φwat+1 + (1− φ)wmt+1βeθt
h(et+1) = βe
θ
t+1
Eyt+1 = qt+1wat+1 + (1− qt+1)h(et+1)wmt+1
et ≥ 0, nt ≥ 0, and 1− (τ q + τ eet+1)nt+1 ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst two constraints give the consumption of the individual and her potential income, where
φ is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the individual works in agriculture and 0 if he
works in manufacturing. The next constraint gives the human capital of the oﬀspring followed
by the expected potential income of an oﬀspring. The last line gives the constraints that fertility,
education investments, and consumption be non-negative.
The consumer’s problem is solved in the appendix, where we suppose that α = 0.5 in order
to get explicit analytical solutions. There we show that the f.o.c. yield the following expressions
for education and fertility
n∗t (τ
q + τ ee∗t ) = γ, (6)
1− θ
θ
e∗t +
qtwat
(1− qt)wmt
(e∗t )1−θ
βθ
=
τ q
τ e
. (7)
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The ﬁrst equation is standard and gives the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ faced by parents, implying
that any shock that reduces optimal education investments, e∗, results in an increase in fertility
and vice versa. The second equation implicitly deﬁnes the optimal education investment as a
function of the two wages and population proportions. This equation captures, as in Galor and
Weil (2000), the fact that education investment in children depends on the way it impacts the
expected wage of the oﬀspring. The main diﬀerence with existing work is that investments in
education will depend on the relative returns in the two sectors.
Before we fully solve the model, it is interesting to do some comparative statics with respect
to q and wages, noting that all variables are constant over time. From the two equations
above it is straight-forward to show that ∂e∗/∂q < 0 and ∂n∗/∂q > 0 , implying that a higher
agricultural employment share reduces education and increases fertility. The intuition for this
eﬀect is simply that since education has no value in the agricultural sector, a higher probability
that one’s children work in agriculture reduces the expected marginal gain of educating an
oﬀspring and hence will reduce parents’ incentive to invest in their education. An increase in
the relative wage in agriculture, i.e. a higher value of the ratio wa/wm, would have the same
eﬀect as an increase in agricultural employment.
The full solution to the model requires solving for wages and employment. Assuming no
mobility costs, income is equalized across sectors and labour market equilibrium is given by the
expression watpt = wmth(et), which yields the equilibrium values of wages and employment.
12
We are interested in the impact of an increase in the price of the agricultural good, and in the
appendix we show that a higher value of p increases the wage rate in agriculture, leading to a
ﬂow of labour into that sector, so that agricultural employment is
q =
ap2
ap2 + h(e)
,
where a ≡ AT/K. A higher price of agricultural goods and a lower level of education increase
employment in agriculture. Note also that if districts diﬀer in the quantity or productivity of
their land, they will also diﬀer in their share of employment in agriculture, with a higher A
and/or T (i.e. a higher a) resulting in a higher q.
From equation (7) note that the only magnitude that matters for education decisions is the
ratio of the expected wage in the two sectors, which we denote ω. It is possible to show that in
equilibrium
12There is a long-standing debate about the degree of mobility of farmers in France and whether or not their
reluctance to move choked industrial expansion. See Sicsic (1992) for a review of the literature and evidence of
the comovement of agricultural and manufacturing wages. In any case, all our results would hold is we introduced
ﬁnite costs of moving into manufacturing.
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ω ≡ qwa
(1− q)wm = ap
2.
The expected relative wage in agriculture is hence increasing in the price of agricultural goods
p.
Suppose the economy faces a price of agricultural goods p and that the resulting fertility
and education decisions are given by n and e. Consider now the introduction of a permanent
tariﬀ on agricultural products at time t that increases the price of agricultural goods to p > p.
Diﬀerentiating the two equilibrium equations, it is straightforward to show that the higher price
will result in an education investment e lower than e and a fertility rate n higher than n. The
former is the result of the decrease in the relative return to education, while the usual quality-
quantity trade-oﬀ implies that as parents spend less time in children’s education, they have
more of them. Note also that
d2e
dadp
< 0 and
d2n
dadp
> 0,
that is, the reduction in education and the increase in fertility are stronger the greater agricul-
tural productivity is. Since a higher a implies that a greater share of population is employed
in agriculture before the price shock, districts which have a high initial employment share in
agriculture will be those experiencing the sharpest changes in our two variables of interest.
The model hence implies that an increase in the tariﬀ on agricultural goods that raises the
agricultural wage leads parents to reduce the educational investment per child and to increase the
number of children they bear, the eﬀect being stronger the larger is the share of the population
employed in agriculture before the policy shock.
4 Econometric speciﬁcation
Inspired by the model above, our empirical speciﬁcation consists of the following two equations:
Fit = α0 + α1Si ∗Mt + ηi + δt + δ1it+ δ2it2 + it, (8)
Eit = β0 + β1Si ∗Mt + μi + γt + δ3it+ δ4it2 + υit, (9)
where Fit and Eit are respectively fertility and education in department i at time t. We intro-
duce district ﬁxed eﬀects (ηi, μi) and year ﬁxed eﬀects (δt, γt), while the coeﬃcients δ1i to δ4i
capture the impact of district-speciﬁc time trends aﬀecting fertility and education. We allow for
quadratic time trends when we have annual data but only linear ones whenever we have only
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quinquennial census data. Mt is a dummy for whether the Me´line tariﬀ is in operation at time
t and Si is the local share of employment in cereal production in the year in which the tariﬀ
is introduced. This variable hence acts as a proxy for the capacity for cereal production, and
thus the larger Si is, the stronger we expect the eﬀect of the tariﬀ to be. Note that we cannot
identify the non-interacted eﬀect of the variables Mt and Si, as the impact of the former cannot
be distinguished from that of the year ﬁxed-eﬀects and the latter is collinear with the district
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our coeﬃcients of interest are thus α1 and β1, which capture the diﬀerential impact of the
tariﬀ across districts with diﬀerent degrees of cereal production. Uniﬁed growth theory predicts
a trade-oﬀ between fertility and education so that the coeﬃcients α1 and β1 are of opposite
sign. The model above implies that the tariﬀ acts a negative shock to the returns to education,
leading to higher fertility and lower education, so that we expect α1 > 0 and β1 < 0.
The time structure of the impact of a policy is crucial, as discussed by Wolfers (2006). Al-
though the eﬀect of the tariﬀ on prices is immediate, fertility and education are likely to respond
with a lag because wages may adjust slowly and bearing children and educating them take time,
but also because both variables are aﬀected by social norms resulting from past behaviour that
may slowdown the reaction to policy. We will thus consider two further speciﬁcations for each
of our dependent variables. For fertility, the ﬁrst one takes the form
Fit = α0 + α1Mt ∗ Expt + α2Si ∗Mt ∗ Expt + ηi + δt + δ1it+ δ2it2 + it, (10)
where Expt denotes the number of years of exposure to the policy, and we expect the coeﬃcient
α2 to be positive, indicating that households take time to adjust their fertility to the policy.
13 An alternative speciﬁcation, based on Wolfers’ analysis of divorce laws, allows for a diﬀerent
impact of the tariﬀ in diﬀerent years, that is,
Fit = α0 + α1Si ∗Mt +
∑
k>1
αkSi ∗Mt + ηi + δt + δ1it+ δ2it2 + it, (11)
where α1 is the initially eﬀect of the policy and αk indicates the excess impact that occurs after
k years. This speciﬁcation gives greater ﬂexibility when estimating the impact of the policy,
allowing, for example, for the possibility that there is a small impact immediately after the
introduction of the tariﬀ while fertility norms adapt to the new regime.
Similarly, we consider two speciﬁcations for education which take the form
13We introduce Mt ∗ Expt not interacted with Si in this speciﬁcation since it is not collinear neither with the
year ﬁxed eﬀects nor with the time trends which are district speciﬁc.
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Eit = β0 + β1Mt ∗ Expt + β2Si ∗Mt ∗ Expt + μi + γt + δ3it+ δ4it2 + υit, (12)
Eit = β0 + β1Si ∗Mt +
∑
k>1
βkSi ∗Mt + μi + γt + δ3it+ δ4it2 + υit. (13)
5 The data
Although France has relatively good historical data, the diﬃculty lies in the unit of observation
that we are interested in: the district or de´partement, which we term ’department’ through
the paper. These were the regional administrative units at the time, and are still the main
administrative units in France with most of them covering the same areas and having the same
names as in the late 19th century, although the number has slightly increased.
We use several sources to compile our data on education and fertility. The ﬁrst is the Annu-
aire Statistique de la France, from which we have regional data on live births, total population,
and the number of students enrolled in primary education. To create measures of fertility, en-
rollment and attendance, we use the census or Recensement Ge´ne´ral, which is available for the
years 1872, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 1906, and 1911, and provides data on various
groups of population by age and gender.
Crude birth rates by department are deﬁned as the number of live births per 1,000 inhab-
itants, while the fertility rate is computed as the ratio of live births to the number of women
aged between 15 and 49 in 1,000s. Demographers have raised concerns about a number of obser-
vations given in the census as in certain years the various measures available are not consistent
with each other. Corrections of these data have been proposed to take into account this concern
and we use those to calculate the fertility rate, as proposed by Van de Walle (1974) and Bonneuil
(1997).
Our measure of educational investment are enrolment rates in primary education, a measure
that includes both public and private schools. Data are available for the overall number of
students enrolled in primary education and for those aged 6 to 13, the diﬀerence between the
two being presumably older students.14 The data are available separately for all students,
for boys and for girls, so we compute both overall and gender-speciﬁc enrolment rates. It is
conceivable that the tariﬀ had diﬀerent eﬀects across the genders. For example, if the tariﬀ
made agriculture a more desirable occupation and if this was largely a male-dominate activity,
girls’ education could have been aﬀected less than boys’. Alternatively, if the tariﬀ had a positive
14See Grew and Harrigan (1991) for an introduction to the data and Luc (1985) for a discussion on the method
used by the French education ministry to survey the enrolled.
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impact on fertility, this may have kept more girls at home to help with household chores and
caring for younger siblings.
To obtain enrolment rates for those in the relevant age group we use the population aged
6 to 13, which is available on census years (1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 1906), hence the last
observation includes individuals born in 1900, i.e. 8 years after the tariﬀ was introduced. As
discussed above the population data by age group is not always reliable, and in a number of
cases the enrolment rate we obtain is well over 100%. Since no correction is available for this
age group, we simply remove from our sample the observations that are 101% or higher. As an
alternative measure we also compute enrolment of those aged between 6 and 13 years as a share
of the total department’s population.
The number of students enrolled in primary education outside the standard age group (6
to 13 years) can be substantial, amounting to between 35 and 45% of those enrolled in some
departments. We therefore construct two additional measures of enrolment: the ﬁrst is the
overall number of students enrolled the total population, the second is those enrolled who are
outside the 6-13 age group over the total population.
We start our sample in 1872 and if possible we compile data up to 1913, yielding a 42-year
period with half of the observations pre-dating the Me´line tariﬀ and half of them occurring after
the policy was in place. We exclude from our sample Alsace and parts of Lorraine due to their
annexation by Prussia in 1871, as well as Corsica for which there is no data on agricultural
employment, thus reducing our sample to 85 departments. Four observations are missing for
Meurthe et Moselle between 1872 and 1875, as the department was a merge of the two remaining
parts of former departments 54 and 57 that were no longer part of France following the 1870
war. Our sample hence contains at most 3566 observations, all of which are available for birth
rates. For fertility and enrolment rates the quinquennial availability of censuses reduces our
sample to around 500 observations.
Our policy variable is the interaction between a dummy for the Me´line tariﬀ and a measure
of the importance of cereal production in the department’s economy in 1892. Data on the share
of employment in cereal production are not available, hence we use as a proxy the product of
the share of agricultural employment in total employment in 1892 and the share of the value of
cereal production in total agricultural production in 1892, i.e. the last year before the tariﬀ could
have an impact. The data concerning these two variables comes from Van de Walle (1974) and
Bonneuil (1997). Note that since cereals are generally less labour intensive than other crops, our
proxy will be overestimating employment in cereal production. The resulting measurement error
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Figure 4: Employment share in local production across French districts in 1892
will tend to bias our coeﬃcients of interest towards zero, implying that our estiamtes represent
a lower bound of the true eﬀect.15
The dummy variable Me´line takes the value 0 up to 1892 and the value 1 from 1893 onwards,
1893 being the ﬁrst year in which we could observe a change in fertility or education. As discussed
the time structure of the eﬀect of the policy is of crucial importance, as this variable can have
diﬀerent eﬀects depending on how long the policy has been in operation. We will thus use the
variable Exposure to measure the number of years that the policy has been in place, and will
also allow for diﬀerential impacts every three or ﬁve years.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics. Me´line is the interaction term between the share
of employment in cereal production and the dummy taking a value of one from 1893 onwards
and zero for earlier years. As we can see in the table, cereal production was an important
activity in France. Its share of employment averages 14.6%, and varied between 26% and 0.07%,
with Lot, Tarn et Garonne and Dordogne being the departments with the highest shares and
Seine that with the lowest. Note, however, that not all departments with a low employment
share in cereals were rich, urban regions. The third lowest share is that of Bouches-du-Rhoˆne,
at 3.5%, a relatively poor region but whose climate is not suitable for cereal production. Figure
15The so-called attenuation bias; see Maddala (1977).
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4 represents the spatial distribution of the share of employment in cereal production. Both birth
rates and fertility rates are high although declining throughout the period, with the average in
the sample being 92 children per thousand women.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Fertility
Table 3 reports the results for birth rates. The ﬁrst column simply includes a 0-1 dummy starting
in 1893 which is interacted with the share of employment in cereal production, as well as a
department-speciﬁc linear time trend. The variable has an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating
that if we impose a common eﬀect over the 20 years following the introduction of the Me´line
tariﬀ we are unable to identify its eﬀect. As argued by Wolfers (2006), when the underlying
process is trended, the way in which the time structure is modelled becomes crucial. The second
column hence considers the impact of the number of years during which the policy has been in
place (Exposure). The coeﬃcient on Exposure interacted with the share of cereals is positive and
highly signiﬁcant, indicating that protectionism increased birth rates in those departments with
a higher share of cereal employment and that the eﬀect grows over time. Column 3 presents
the most ﬂexible speciﬁcation, based on equation (11), which allows for diﬀerential eﬀects every
three years. The initial eﬀect, as captured by the coeﬃcient on Me´line*Cereal is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, but after three years becomes signiﬁcant and increases over time, rapidly in
the ﬁrst decade and more slowly afterwards. This seems to imply that households adapted their
fertility gradually in response to the change in the relative return to education.
The next three columns estimate those speciﬁcations including both a linear and a quadratic
department-speciﬁc time trend. Coeﬃcients have the same sign and signiﬁcance, and are some-
what larger. The speciﬁcation using exposure indicates that the tariﬀ increased the birth rate by
1.33 births in the ﬁrst year, by 13.3 after 10 years and so on. Similar magnitudes are obtained
with the dynamic speciﬁcation, with no change over the ﬁrst three years, an increase of about
9.6 births after 10-12 years, and of 19 births after two decades.
Table 4 reports the same speciﬁcations using as the dependent variable fertility rates, where,
because census data reporting the number of females of child-bearing age is only available every
ﬁve years, we have only quinquennial observations. The results are consistent with those obtained
with birth rates: the interaction between the tariﬀ and cereal production has an insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient, but when we allow for a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation the coeﬃcients are positive and
signiﬁcant. Column 3 reports the regression based on equation (11). Interestingly, we ﬁnd that
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the eﬀect increases over time and is about twice as large at the end of the period as immediately
after the shock.
The magnitude of these eﬀects is large. In a department with 26% of the population employed
in cereal production, i.e. the highest share that we observe, 10 years after its introduction the
tariﬀ had increased the fertility rate by 5.7 children per 1,000 women (column 2). The average
increase across all departments is 3.3 children per 1,000 women after 10 years, 6.6 by 1912,
ﬁgures which are equivalent to 18% and 37% of the standard deviation of fertility. Birth rates
increased by 4 children after 20 years, i.e. by 50% of the variation across departments.
As we have discussed, this was a period of declining birth rates and it is interesting to
compare the impact of the policy with that of the time trend, since the former oﬀset the decline
in birth rates that had been taking place since the late 18th century. Using the formulation in
table 2, column 5, we ﬁnd that the combination of the time trend and the tariﬀ implies that
for the average department, i.e. one with a cereal share of 15%, it is only 17 years after the
introduction of the tariﬀ that the fertility rate returns to its 1892 level.16 During the same
period, departments with no cereal production at all witnessed a reduction of the birth rate of
-3.3 children. In other words, the tariﬀ implied a 17-year delay in the reduction of fertility for
the average department.
In order to visualize the diﬀerential impact of the tariﬀ, 5 depicts the evolution of the
birth rate in 6 selected departments. Two of them, Seine and Bouches-du-Rhoˆne have the
lowest values of our proxy for employment in cereal production, 0.07% and 3.5%. The former
encompasses Paris and its surroundings and the latter Marseille and part of Provence, and
although they host the two largest cities in France their production structure was very diﬀerent,
with the former having virtually no agricultural employment and the latter having almost 20%
of the labour force employed in agriculture, the main crops being wine, fruit and vegetables. As
we can see, the introduction of the tariﬀ, indicated by the vertical line, did not coincide with
any disruption in the time trend for birth rates. Landes and Saoˆne-et-Loire have average cereal
shares, around 15 percent, and in both cases the data indicate an increase in birth rates after
1892. Lastly, Lot et Tarn-et-Garonne have the largest shares, 26 percent; an increase in birth
rates is observed in the latter while for the former the rapid decline witnessed over the previous
two decades comes to a sudden halt.
16These calculations use a common time trend estimated on pre-treatment data.
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Figure 5: The evolution of the birth rate in 6 selected de´partements, 1872-1913
6.2 Education
Consider now the eﬀect on education. Table 5 presents the results for enrolment rates, deﬁned
as the number of students registered in primary education over the relevant age group (6 to
13 year-old). We report results for all children, for boys only and for girls only since, as we
have argued above, the eﬀect could be diﬀerent across the sexes. The number of observations
is constrained by the census years for which we have data on population by age. The last
observation is hence for 1911 and includes individuals born between 1898 and 1905, i.e. up to
13 years after the tariﬀ was introduced.
The ﬁrst three columns report our three speciﬁcations for all children: one simply including
the Me´line tariﬀ interacted with cereal employment, one multiplying this share by the number
of years of exposure to the tariﬀ, and another that allows for a diﬀerent eﬀect in years nine and
14 after the tariﬀ’s introduction (the ﬁrst census after the introduction of the tariﬀ is that of
1896). The coeﬃcient on our variable of interest is negative and signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations.
The next columns present two speciﬁcations for boys and girls, respectively. The coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant and have the expected sign, and imply that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the two gender groups. There are two possible interpretations for this result.
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If cereal production were not gender-biased in France, the tariﬀ would have the same impact on
the relative returns of male and female education. Alternatively, if it were mainly males that
worked in the cereal sector, two oﬀsetting eﬀects could be in operation: boys’ education fell
due to a change in its relative return, while girls were kept out of school in order to help in a
household where there were now more younger siblings to care for.
Note that the coeﬃcient on Me´line in equation (1) is not the average of the three coeﬃcients
obtained when we allow for diﬀerential eﬀects as the average eﬀects implied by equations (2) and
(3), -32.5, are smaller that the coeﬃcient obtained in equation (1) where we impose a constant
impact of the tariﬀ over time. The reason for this is that we include in our speciﬁcations a
department-speciﬁc time trend, and in the absence of diﬀerential eﬀects of the tariﬀ over time
this trend has to capture the dynamics that are actually due to the policy. These diﬀerences
indicate the importance of allowing for diﬀerential impact of a policy over time, as argued by
Wolfers (2006). 17
One problem with the data on enrolment rates is that primary education registries indicate
that a substantial fraction of students are older than 13. We hence consider separately the
number of pupils aged 6 to 13 and those aged over 13. Since we do not have the age range for
the latter group, we construct enrolment rates deﬁned as the number of pupils over the total
population. The results are reported in table 6. The ﬁrst two columns consider pupils of all
ages and ﬁnd a negative eﬀect except for the last census year (1911). The 1911 census does not
report population by detailed age groups, hence column three runs the same regression dropping
that sample year. Columns 3 and 4 report results for the 6 to 13 age group. The tariﬀ reduces
enrolment of this age group in high cereal-producing departments, with the eﬀect increasing
over time and being signiﬁcant in all periods. The last two columns of the table examine the
enrolment rate of those older than 13, and ﬁnd no eﬀect of the tariﬀ on the enrolment rate of
young adults.
The magnitude of the eﬀect is substantial. Table 5, column (1) implies that for a 15%
employment rate in cereal production, the tariﬀ reduces enrolment rates by 6 percentage points,
which amounts to almost 75 percent of the standard deviation. These eﬀects are very large when
we compare them to the evolution of enrolment rates over time: over the decade prior to the
introduction of the tariﬀ, the enrolment rate increased by only 1.4 percentage points in France.
When we allow for diﬀerent eﬀects across time, we ﬁnd that the strongest impact occurs nine
17It is straightforward to verify that regressions as those in table 5 but without the department speciﬁc time
trend yield an average eﬀect that is the same whether we run a regression with only a policy dummy or with
diﬀerential eﬀects.
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Figure 6: Evolution of the Enrolment Rate in 6 selected de´partements, France 1876-1906
years after the introduction of the tariﬀ, with the eﬀect falling again by year 14.
Figure 6 depicts six examples of the evolution of enrolment rates: those with the lowest
shares of employment in cereal production, Seine and Bouches-du-Rhoˆne, two with average
shares, Landes and Saoˆne-et-Loire, and those with the highest shares, Lot and Tarn-et-Garonne.
Although enrolment rates appear to have fallen in all departments around 1892, the decline is
less marked in the departments including Paris and Marseille, and is particularly strong in Lot
and Tarn-et-Garonne.
6.3 Robustness
To test the robustness of our results we perform two exercises. The ﬁrst consists of using
two alternative agricultural crops. It is possible that our explanatory variable captures some
change, for example, technological, that aﬀected another crop. If there is a correlation between
employment in the two crops, our explanatory variable could simply be picking the impact of
changes related to the other crop. Including the latter would then render the former insigniﬁcant.
We hence use our Experience and Me´line dummies interacted with the share of employment in
wine production and that in fruit and vegetables, both of them major crops in France at the
time, with these shares proxied by the product between agricultural employment and the ratio
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between the total value of the crop’s output to the total value of agricultural output.
The results are reported in table 8. For our three dependent variables, birth rates, fertility
rates and enrolment we obtain equivalent results. The coeﬃcient on the shock interacted with
the share of cereal employment remains highly signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude as those
previously obtained. While employment in fruit and vegetable production never exhibits a sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcient, that on employment in wine production is signiﬁcant in two speciﬁcations,
birth rates and fertility rates. A possible explanation is that the increase in agricultural wages
brought about by the tariﬀ also rendered employment in wine production more attractive. Re-
gions with geographical conditions favorable to vineyards hence experienced a stronger increase
in birth rates.
Our second speciﬁcation considers alternative time shocks in order to examine whether an-
other shock that took place sooner or latter is being proxied by our explanatory variable. We
thus construct the Me´line dummy and the Exposure variable as before, except that we either lag
them by 10 years (i.e. the shock occurs in 1882) or forward them by 10 years (shock in 1902).
We then interact them with the share of cereals in 1882. Table 7 presents the results for the
birth rate, the fertility rate and enrolment rates. These speciﬁcations are extremely demanding
on the data as they include year ﬁxed-eﬀects, department-speciﬁc time trends, and two shocks
with a 10-year interval. The ﬁrst two columns indicate that although the alternative shocks
reduce the signiﬁcant of our explanatory variable, its coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. For fertility and education we have a much smaller sample size. All the shocks have an
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient in the fertility regressions, which as we had seen earlier give the least
satisfactory results; in contrast, the two regressions for enrolment rates yield highly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients for our explanatory variable.
7 Conclusions
This paper examines how an economic shock aﬀects education and fertility decisions in order
to test the validity of the hypothesis that is a cornerstone of Uniﬁed Growth Theory. Our
identiﬁcation strategy relies on a major policy shock that took place in late 19th century France,
the 1892 Me´line tariﬀ, a large tariﬀ on cereal imports that substantially increased the return
to agricultural employment. We develop a two-sector model with endogenous education and
birth rates in which, under the assumption that the returns to human capital are higher in
manufacturing than in agriculture, a change in the price of agricultural goods implies a reduction
in the relative return to education and hence leads to both lower investments in human capital
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and higher fertility rates.
In order to test these predictions, we use data on French departments for the period 1872
to 1913 and compute each department’s employment in cereal production just before the intro-
duction of the tariﬀ. Our identiﬁcation strategy is based on the fact that the Me´line tariﬀ had
a diﬀerential eﬀect across departments depending on the share of cereal production in employ-
ment. Three outcome measures are used: fertility rates, birth rates, and enrolment in primary
education. We ﬁnd that, in line with the model, fertility and birth rates increased in departments
where cereal production was important, while educational attainment fell.
These results contribute to the debate on the origins of modern growth. Critics of Uniﬁed
Growth Theory claim that at the time of the fertility transition the number of children was
not responsive to economic conditions, but rather the result of social norms and the absence
of eﬀective birth-control technologies, while education was largely constrained by its supply. A
number of previous analyses using historical data have shown that education aﬀected fertility
decisions and vice versa, yet no work has so far examined quantity-quality responses to economic
incentives. The main contribution of our paper hence lies in identifying how a major aggregate
economic shock can impact households’ education and fertility decisions.
Our paper also contributes to a vast literature in economic history on the eﬀects of protec-
tionism, which has largely focused on the wave of anti-free-trade policies that swept Europe in
the wake of rising imports from the Americas. The Me´line tariﬀ stands out as one of the rare
instances of a protectionist policy that had a positive eﬀect, notably resulting in higher real
wages. Our results imply a more nuanced evaluation of the tariﬀ, making it responsible for the
brief increase in fertility that occurred at the end of the 19th century, as well as for the so-called
‘lost decade’ in education. Further work is needed to fully understand the full consequences of
the tariﬀ. In particular, given that fertility and education decisions can be to a large extent
perpetuated, protectionism may have created productivity diﬀerences across departments that
resulted in long term regional disparities. We leave this analysis for future work.
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8 Tables
Observations mean standard dev. min max
Cereal share in agricultural production 85 .2682 .0775 .0356 .4439
Share of employment in agriculture 85 .5385 .1476 .0151 .7529
Share of employment in cereals 85 .1485 .0612 .0008 .2614
Meline*Cereal 85 .0637 .0837 0 .2614
Exposure to Meline policy*Cereal .573 .867 0 3.659
Birth rate 3,566 22.46 3.940 13.80 35.43
Fertility rate 763 93.97 17.19 54.89 175.02
Enrolment rate, aged 6–13 595 93.94 8.19 51.99 120.6
Enrolment rate, boys 595 118.99 13.98 64.92 170.52
Enrolment rate, girls 595 118.07 14.67 56.43 164.82
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Meline Exposure Dynamic Meline Exposure Dynamic
Meline*Cereal -0.0487 1.394 -0.101 1.751
(1.855) (1.716) (1.875) (1.232)
Exposure -0.0508 0.136
(0.0359) (0.0886)
Exp*Cereal 0.971∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗
(0.213) (0.545)
Years4-6*Cereal 3.373∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗
(1.087) (1.403)
Years7-9*Cereal 4.475∗∗ 5.214∗∗
(1.813) (2.492)
Years10-12*Cereal 8.354∗∗∗ 9.590∗∗
(2.334) (3.885)
Years13-15*Cereal 11.56∗∗∗ 13.38∗∗
(2.960) (5.590)
Years16-18*Cereal 17.21∗∗∗ 19.69∗∗
(3.446) (7.720)
Years19-21*Cereal 15.85∗∗∗ 19.08∗∗
(3.881) (8.969)
Linear trend *dpt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic trend *dpt No No No Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.904 0.909 0.910 0.922 0.922 0.923
Observations 3566 3566 3566 3566 3566 3566
Standard errors in parentheses
Notes:
(1) The period of estimation is 1872-1913;
(2) Standard errors are clustered at the departement level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Birth rate
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(1) (2) (3)
Meline Exposure Dynamic
Meline*Cereal 17.29 21.07∗
(13.78) (11.40)
Exposure -0.110
(0.172)
Exp*Cereal 2.196∗∗
(1.062)
Year9*Cereal 2.133
(15.76)
Year14*Cereal 17.31
(27.85)
Year19*Cereal 27.77∗∗
(12.41)
Linear trend *dpt Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.718 0.719 0.718
Observations 763 763 763
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Fertility rate - census years only
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All children All children All children Boys Boys Girls Girls
Meline*Cereal -40.22∗∗∗ -32.55∗∗∗ -41.01∗∗∗ -34.13∗∗∗ -45.32∗∗∗ -37.07∗∗∗
(11.14) (11.90) (11.55) (12.35) (11.92) (12.60)
Exposure 0.0636
(0.205)
Exp*Cereal -3.253∗∗
(1.338)
Year9*Cereal -35.45∗∗∗ -35.72∗∗∗ -39.51∗∗∗
(10.39) (10.86) (9.872)
Year14*Cereal -10.08 -16.78 -13.53
(16.72) (16.56) (18.88)
Linear trend *dpt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.534 0.557 0.406 0.421 0.609 0.624
Observations 469 469 469 469 469 469 469
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the departement level.
(1) Enrolment and schooling population are available for years 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911;
(2) The number of pupils aged 6-13 is available every census year except 1911; 1911 ﬁgures are absent from column 3.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Enrolment rate enrolled over relevant age group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All ages All ages All ages w/o 1911 6–13 6–13 Not 6–13 Not 6–13
Meline*Cereal -4.577∗∗∗ -5.046∗∗∗ -5.046∗∗∗ -4.642∗∗∗ -4.503∗∗ -0.573 -0.543
(1.450) (1.854) (1.872) (1.697) (1.738) (0.906) (1.000)
Year9*Cereal -2.871∗∗ -2.871∗∗ -2.163 -0.708
(1.374) (1.387) (1.383) (0.936)
Year14*Cereal -4.731∗ -4.731∗ -3.492 -1.239
(2.661) (2.687) (2.365) (1.136)
Year19*Cereal -5.707
(3.532)
Linear trend *dpt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.590 0.594 0.585 0.547 0.550 0.464 0.464
Observations 680 680 595 595 595 595 595
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the departement level.
(1) Enrolment and the schooling population are available for years 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911;
(2) The number of pupils aged 6-13 is available every census year except 1911;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Enrolment rate (enrolled over total population)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Birth rate Birth rate Fertility Fertility Enrolment Enrolment
Exposure 0.104 0.0323 0.220 1.517∗∗∗
(0.0847) (0.106) (0.264) (0.417)
Exposure*Cereal 1.294∗∗ 1.535∗∗ 2.127 2.445
(0.527) (0.674) (1.651) (2.561)
Exposure lagged 0.0983 -0.595
(0.0905) (0.440)
Exp*Share lagged -0.138 0.118
(0.552) (2.795)
Exposure forward -0.222∗∗ -3.444∗∗∗
(0.0912) (0.640)
Exp*Share forward 0.399 -0.466
(0.560) (3.914)
Meline*Cereal -35.47∗∗∗ -38.62∗∗∗
(13.34) (11.20)
Meline*Cereal lagged 11.03
(13.91)
Meline*Cereal forward 12.45
(12.82)
Linear trend *dpt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic trend *dpt Yes Yes No No No No
Adjusted R2 0.922 0.922 0.719 0.719 0.542 0.543
Observations 3566 3566 763 763 469 469
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Enrolment is the enrolment rate of children agend 6-13 over population aged 6-13;
(2) The shock is lagged/brought forward by 10 years;
(3) Residuals are clustered at the departement level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7: Robustness: Diﬀerent timing
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Birth rate Birth rate Fertility Fertility Enrolment Enrolment
Exposure 0.0605 0.111 -0.355∗ -0.0687
(0.0915) (0.0937) (0.190) (0.184)
Exposure*Cereal 1.589∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗ 3.022∗∗∗ 2.357∗∗
(0.523) (0.568) (1.019) (1.116)
Exp*Wine 0.741∗ 2.371∗∗
(0.440) (0.978)
Exp*FruitVeg 0.937 -1.527
(1.476) (2.743)
Meline*Cereal -41.16∗∗∗ -35.28∗∗
(12.30) (13.64)
Mel*Wine -2.688
(9.060)
Mel*FruitVeg -50.98
(47.77)
Linear trend *dpt Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic trend *dpt Yes Yes No No No No
Adjusted R2 0.923 0.922 0.722 0.719 0.541 0.544
Observations 3566 3566 763 763 469 469
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Enrolment is the enrolment rate of children agend 6-13 over population aged 6-13;
(2) Shock is lagged/brought forward by 10 years;
(3) Residuals are clustered at the departement level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Robustness: Diﬀerent crops
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9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix 1
This appendix derives some of the results reported in section 3.
The maximization problem in (5) yields the following ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to
n and e
(1− γ)nt+1Eyt+1yt(τ q + τ eet+1) = γct [qt+1wat+1 + (1− qt+1)h(et+1)wmt+1] , (A.1)
(1− γ)nt+1Eyt+1ytτ e = γct(1− qt+1)wmt+1h′(et+1). (A.2)
Dividing one by the other and using the expression for h(e) we get (7) in the text. Rear-
ranging (A.1) and using the expressions for ct and Eyt+1, we have
(τ q + τ eet+1)nt+1 = γ. (A.3)
Consider now the allocation of labour across sectors. Labour market equilibrium implies
watpt = wmth(et). Since wages are equal to the marginal product of labour and assuming that
α = 0.5, we have
ap2tLmt = Lath(et). (A.7)
Substituting for Lt = Lmt + Lat and deﬁning qt ≡ Lat/Lt, we get equation (5).
9.2 Appendix 2
This appendix gives further details on the data.
Territory and population. The French territory was subdivided into 86 de´partements, that
were roughly the size of a US county. We dropped the department ’Corsica’ because data
availability problems.
Demographic variables. The number of births, of female aged 15 to 50 and of the total of the
population is available every 5 years, more precisely in 1872, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901,
1906, 1911. The population ﬁgures were interpolated yearly using the average of the growth
rate of the population between 2 censuses, except in 1912 and 1913 for which we extrapolate the
average growth rate of the 1906-1911 period. We use the data available online on the website of
the French national statistical institute INSEE (www.insee.fr) and on the website of the Centre
de Recherche Historique (CRH thereafter) of the EHESS (http://acrh.revues.org/2890). Those
data were digitized as part of the ICPSR project (https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/).
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Education.
School enrolment. Throughout the period, primary schooling was compulsory between
age 6 and below age 13 but it was pretty common for older or younger children to attend a
primary school. A non negligeable number of students attend private school and confessional
school and we add the number of pupils of those schools to those of public schools. The number
of high school students was usually very low in most de´partement, which forbid to used the
enrollment rate in high school as a measure of secondary education. We take three variables in
the periodical published by the Ministry of Education ’Statistiques de l’Enseignement Primaire’
(statistic on primary education): the number of children (boys and girls) aged 6 to 13 enrolled in
primary school (public or private), the total number of students in any of the primary schools,
and the total of children aged 6 to 13 counted in each census. Digitized data are available
online at these web addresses http://acrh.revues.org/3376 for the part digitized by the National
statistical oﬃce INSEE and http://acrh.revues.org/3038 for the part digitized by the CRH of
the EHESS. Table 9 gives the name of the ﬁle and the name of the three variables used to
compute enrollment rate. The following corrections were made to correct for typos and errors.
In 1881, the relevant variables in ﬁle T53.xls that write the number of children enrolled are
V176, V177 and V178. They are obviously miscalculated, and we therefore came back to the
data published in the Statistical yearbook of the French government that published in its 1884
edition the number of pupils enrolled in 1881 (Annuaire statistique de la France, 1884, p. 261).
In 1896, there is a typo in the online resource for the number of children aged 6 to 13 enrolled
in schools for department #41 that we correct using the Annuaire statistique de la France from
22,409 to 32,409. The publication of the survey by the ministry of education was discontinued
after 1906. We were able to retrieve the total number of enrolled and the number of children
aged 6 to 13 in other sources. We retrieve the number of enrolled students from the section
publishing the number on ”primary education” in the yearly Annuaire statistique de la France
(1912, p. 89, reduced to ASF in table 9). We retrieve the number of children aged 6 to 13 by
adding the number of children born each year between 1899 to 1905 and alive in 1911. To add
1911 to the database, we add the relevant numbers as they were stored in the census ﬁle of 1911
published in dataset number DS244 1 available on the CRH website.
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Year File Boys & girls Girls Boys
Aged 6-13 Enrolled Enrolled Aged 6-13 Enrolled Enrolled Aged 6-13 Enrolled Enrolled
census Aged 6-13 all ages census Aged 6-13 all ages census Aged 6-13 all ages
1876 print Table 1 Table 31 Table 28 Table 1 Table 30 Table 28 Table 1 Table 29 Table 28
1881 ENSP T53 V207 V211 ASF V199 V203 ASF V191 V195 ASF
1886 ENSP T57 V227 V231 V198 V219 V223 V197 V211 V215 V196
1891 ENSP T79 V142 V146 V111 V133 V137 V110 V124 V128 V109
1896 ENSP T83 V44 V48 V9 V35 V39 V8 V26 V30 V7
1901 DS208 1 V110 V114 V75 V101 V105 V74 V92 V95 V73
1906 DS203 V139 V143 V104 V130 V134 V103 V121 V125 V102
1911 DS244 1 census NA ASF census NA ASF census NA ASF
V stands for variable, ASF stands for Annuaire statistique de la France, see text for details
Table 9: Sources used to construct enrollment rates
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